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We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution 
concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the 
question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core. 
We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as refinements (perfect and 
stable equilibria) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria). 
Motivated by experiments that show systematic theory violations, behavioral game 
theory aims to integrate insights from psychology to get better answers to the 
question ‘how do humans play?’. We provide an overview of the observed 
regularities and briefly sketch (beginnings of) theories of boundedly rational play.  
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Games are mathematical models of interactive decision situations, i.e. situations in 
which multiple decision makers, each one with its own objectives, jointly determine 
the outcome. Game theory aims to predict what players will do in such situations 
and what outcomes will result. The theory has been applied in economics, other 
social sciences, biology and computer science, among others. Aumann (1987) 
presents an overview of how the field developed in the 20th century. The 3-volume 
‘Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications’ (Aumann and Hart, 
1992/1994/2002) provides a fairly complete overview of rationalistic game theory 
in almost 2400 pages. Excellent textbooks at the graduate level are Myerson (1991) 
and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). For more information and detailed references, 
the reader is advised to consult any of these sources. Behavioral game theory is 
more recent, less established and developing more quickly; Camerer (2003) 
provides a good starting point for this branch.   
 
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel has 
been awarded to game theorists four times. In 1994, John Harsanyi, John Nash and 
Reinhard Selten shared the Prize for developing equilibrium theory in non-
cooperative games; in 2005 Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling shared it for 
enhancing our understanding of conflict and cooperation by mean of game theoretic 
analysis; in 2007 Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson were praised 
for developing the theory of mechanism design, while in 2012 Alvin Roth and Lloyd 
Shapley received the Prize for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of 
market design. Researchers from closely related fields were honored in 1996 (James 
Mirrlees and William Vickrey; incentives under asymmetric information), in 2002 
(Daniel Kahneman, Vernon L. Smith; behavioral economics and experimental 
economics), and in 2009 (Elinor Ostrom (who shared the Prize with Oliver 
Williamson); institutional economics). This year, the Prize was awarded to Jean 
Tirole, who has also made important contributions to non-cooperative game theory, 
among others together with Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin. Excellent 
information on the contributions of the Prize winners is available on the official web 





The game theory literature distinguishes two main classes of models: cooperative 
games and non-cooperative games. The terminology, which suggests that in one 
case the players cooperate and in the other don’t, is misleading. The difference is 
not in what players want, but rather in what they are allowed to do. Traditional game 
theory assumes that players are rational and strive to maximize their utility; in this 
respect, there is no difference between the two models. In non-cooperative theory, 
however, it is assumed that the model is complete and that the players are bound by 
its rules. In particular, contracts or commitments are binding only if the formal rules 
explicitly allow this. By contrast, in cooperative theory, players are free to 
negotiate, form coalitions and possibly make side payments, and are assumed to 
have access to a costless external mechanism that enforces agreements. Non-
cooperative theory assumes such an external mechanism is absent, hence, focuses 
on self-enforcing agreements.  
 
The distinction was coined by John Nash in his PhD-thesis (Nash, 1950), which also 
introduced the fundamental solution concept for non-cooperative games (the Nash 
equilibrium concept). In the path-breaking Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), 
the founders of game theory had developed two distinct theories: one for 2-person 
games in which the players have strictly opposite interests (2-person zero-sum 
games) and another for n-person games in which the players can form coalitions and 
make side payments. They had argued that, as soon as there are more than 2 players, 
choosing an ally and forming a coalition becomes crucial, with side-payments being 
key in stabilizing cooperation; hence, that 2-person zero-sum games, in which such 
possibilities are irrelevant, are the exception. Consequently, they assumed that a 
mechanism enforcing coalitions and contracts was available and focused on 
cooperative theory. Nash extended Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 2-person zero-
sum theory and developed the general non-cooperative theory. In this theory, each 
player acts independently, without collaborating with any of the others, however, 
by making full use of all the possibilities for cooperation that the game allows. 
 
A model should be rich enough to allow for the relevant possibilities, but also simple 
enough to allow in-depth analysis and yield insight. Nash argued that non-
cooperative models are more fundamental, as it should always be possible to model 
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coalition negotiations as formal moves in a non-cooperative game. Although 
correct, the resulting model may be too complicated and the attention for details 
may blur the general picture, hence, each type of model has its advantages. 
Possibilities for cooperation can be modeled either as part of the game, or as part of 
the solution concept. In this contribution, we limit ourselves to the former approach. 
As we will see, there exist various deep links between the two approaches.  
Cooperative game theory is surveyed in William Thomson’s contribution to this 
Encyclopedia. 
 
The remainder of the material is structured as follows. We first describe the two 
main classes of non-cooperative models (the extensive form and the strategic (or 
normal) form), and the concept of strategy that allows the reduction of one model 
to the other. Next, we turn to solution concepts that are based on the assumption 
that players are perfectly rational and have full understanding of the game. We 
discuss Nash equilibrium, some of its drawbacks, as well as extensions (correlated 
equilibria) and refinements of it, such as perfect and stable equilibria. The 
experimental literature has shown that human players may deviate from perfect 
rationality in systematic ways; hence, we next discuss recent results from the 
behavioral game theory literature, which aims to construct models of thinking and 
learning that are descriptively more accurate. We close by briefly discussing some 
applications, including the link between cooperative and non-cooperative theory. 
 
 
2. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME MODELS 
 
An ‘extensive game’ is a very detailed model of a conflict situation; it specifies 
which players are involved and how the game evolves over time: which player 
moves when, what information does the player then have, what can he do, what are 
the possible consequences of his actions, and how do the players evaluate the 
outcomes? Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) already provided a set-theoretic 
description of this model, but Kuhn (1953) provided a graph theoretic formulation 




A special case is a game with ‘perfect information’, in which the moves are 
sequential and each player, whenever he has to move, is fully informed about 
everything that has happened before. Chess is a game with perfect information. 
Figure 1 gives a very simple example: player 1 ( moves first and chooses between 
terminating the game, with payoff to  and X to  or giving the move to 
(action ), who then determines whether each player gets 0, or whether  gets 2, 
with  getting Y. We will return to this game below. Most of the literature has 
restricted attention to games with ‘perfect recall’ in which a player never forgets 
what he knew or what he has done before. Bridge, when modeled as a 2-player 
game, has imperfect recall: if EW is the defending team, then W does not know 










                          
    
    
    
  L R 
 0 1,X 1,X 
 I 0,0 2,Y 
   
Table1 
 
   Figure 1 (  
 
By means of the concept of strategy, already introduced in early work of John von 
Neumann, an extensive form game can be reduced to its strategic form. A ‘strategy’ 
for a player is a full plan of action for how to play the game, i.e. it specifies a unique 
action for each decision point of this player and each piece of information that this 
player might then have. Denote by  the set of players in the game and by  the set 
of all strategies for player . Assume that players evaluate outcomes by Von 
Neumann Morgenstern utility functions and let  be the utility function of player  
An -tuple of strategies , one for each player, determines a 
probability distribution over the outcomes and, hence, implies a unique expected 
utility  for each player. Von Neumann argued that the ‘strategic form’ of the 









payoffs, contains all the information that is needed for rational players to determine 
what to do. Consequently, it would suffice to develop theory for ‘strategic games’. 
The literature has debated whether the details of the extensive form are indeed 
irrelevant (see Section 3).Table 1 gives the strategic form of the game from Figure 
1: the rows are the strategies of , the columns the strategies of and in each cell, 
the first number is the payoff (i.e. the utility) to and the second the payoff to  
a convention that will be followed throughout. Note that in a strategic game each 
player only moves once, with players choosing strategies simultaneously.   
 
The interpretation of a ‘strategic game’  is that the data of the game are 
common knowledge: all players are fully informed who the players are, what 
strategies each of them has available and how all players evaluate the possible 
outcomes. Harsanyi (1968) showed how incomplete information can be 
incorporated into the model. In Harsanyi’s model, the game starts with a chance 
move that distributes private information to each player. It is then common 
knowledge what pieces of information each player might have and with what 
probabilities, but the exact piece of information (also called the player’s type) is 
only known to the player himself. Formally, a ‘Bayesian game’ is a tuple 
, where  is the set of players,  is the type space,  is 
a probability distribution on , and  is the vector of utility functions, where each 
player  utility may generally depend on all types and all actions taken, 
.  
 
In a Bayesian game, information is distributed asymmetrically:  is informed about 
his type  and can choose his action  on the basis of it;  only knows his own 
type  and on this basis forms beliefs  about what might know and might 
do, As an example of a Bayesian game, think of a sealed bid auction: each 
bidder knows what the auctioned object is worth to him, but has only imprecise 
information about the value of others. Also see the entry on auctions. A special class 
of Bayesian games, ‘signaling games’, has proved fertile for theory development. 
In such a game, there is only one player with private information, but this player 
moves first; he has to decide how much information to reveal, while his opponents 
have to figure out what information his action might be signaling. (See the entry on 




It should be noted that above we referred to common knowledge in a loose sense: 
all players knowing something is different from that being common knowledge. The 
latter also implies that all players know that all players know it, and that all players 
know that all players know that all players know it, etc; see Aumann (1976) for a 
formal definition. Rubinstein (1989) shows that games with almost common 
knowledge are very different than games with common knowledge. 
 
In the above discussion, we restricted attention to pure strategies; however, there is 
also the possibility of randomization. In a strategic form game, a ‘mixed strategy’ 
of  is a probability distribution  over this player’s set of pure strategies . (We 
will write  for the set of all such probability distributions.) It can be interpreted 
either as an act of deliberate randomization of this player, or as an expression of the 
uncertainty that the other players face about what is going to do. In the latter case, 
 represents the common beliefs held by the opponents of . (The assumption that 
they have the same beliefs makes sense if they have the same information; in a 
Bayesian game,  are the ex-ante beliefs, before the own type is known.)  
 
In an extensive game, one can distinguish two types of randomization. When using 
a mixed strategy, the player randomizes over his pure strategies before the game 
starts. If the player randomizes locally over his actions at each of his information 
sets, this is called a ‘behavior strategy’. A mixed strategy always induces a behavior 
strategy, but the converse only holds in games with prefect recall (Kuhn, 1953); 
hence, in these games, the restriction to behavior strategies is without loss of 
generality. Bridge provides an illustration that, without perfect recall, one may be 
able to play better with mixed strategies: to play optimally, the defending team 
needs to perfectly coordinate the actions of its members without revealing too much 
information; this is possible in a mixed strategy, but not when the team members 








3. RATIONALITY AND EQUILIBRIUM 
 
3.1 Nash equilibrium  
 
The fundamental solution concept for non-cooperative games was introduced by 
John Nash in his 1950 PhD-thesis. The mathematical core of the thesis was 
published as Nash [1951], but the Chapter ‘Motivation and Interpretation’, was not 
published, which may have led to misunderstandings and may have delayed 
development of the field. 
 
Let  be an n-person strategic game. A ‘Nash equilibrium’ of  is a 
strategy combination (either mixed or pure) with the property that each player  is 
playing a best response against the strategies played by the others, hence 
for all . In other words, as long as the others do not deviate from 
their equilibrium strategies, player  cannot improve his payoff by deviating from 
his equilibrium strategy. An equilibrium of an extensive game is defined similarly; 
it simply is an equilibrium of the associated strategic game. An equilibrium of a 
Bayesian game is frequently called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium: each player plays 
a best response against the strategies of the others, whatever his type might be.  
 
Nash provided two justifications for his concept. The first interpretation is 
rationalistic; Nash equilibrium is an answer to the question: what would perfectly 
rational players do? If we assume that a theory of rational play produces a unique 
solution and if the players know the solution, then rational (payoff maximizing) 
players will conform to this solution only if it is a Nash equilibrium. Any other 
(single-valued) theory is self-defeating. While assuming rational players to know 
the solution and to make use of their knowledge seems fine, the assumptions of 
existence and uniqueness are crucial. In fact, as a game may have multiple Nash 
equilibria (see below), this rationalistic justification seems incomplete at best. How 
can a player predict what another player will do if there are multiple Nash 
equilibria? This question motivated a fruitful, long-term research project of two 
Nobel Prize winners, who ultimately showed that additional, but not undisputable, 




The second ‘mass action interpretation’ assumes the game to be repeated, with each 
time players being newly drawn from certain populations and with each player 
accumulating empirical information on the relative advantages of their own 
strategies as well as on how often the opponents play their strategies. If the 
frequencies with which the various pure strategies are used converge, then ‘ the 
mixed strategies representing the average behavior in each of the populations form 
an equilibrium point’. (Nash, 1950, p. 22). In other words, under certain 
assumptions, learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Note that for this second 
interpretation, uniqueness is irrelevant; the initial conditions may determine at 
which equilibrium the process ends up. A large literature has investigated various 
types of learning processes and under which conditions convergence to equilibrium 
is indeed obtained; see Fudenberg and Levine (1998, 2009) and Young (2004) for 
overviews.   
 
A third interpretation originates in the biological literature; see Maynard Smith 
(1982). Strategies are assumed to be randomly matched against each other with the 
payoff   representing the fitness (expected number of offspring) of strategy  
when the state of the system is  The fittest strategies grow fastest, hence, if the 
system converges, it must be to a Nash equilibrium. The literature has studied 
various evolutionary processes, among which the replicator equation; see Weibull 
(1995). 
 
By using a fixed point theorem (such as Brouwer’s or Kakutani’s) one can show 
that any strategic game has a Nash equilibrium, provided one allows equilibria in 
mixed strategies. ‘Matching pennies’ (two players simultaneously choose  or  
with  winning both pennies if the choices match and  winning otherwise), shows 
that not all games have equilibria in pure strategies: in this game each player has to 
randomize.  
 
Mixed strategies and mixed strategy equilibria are frequently viewed as being 
problematic, as players do not have strict incentives to play them: any pure strategy 
in the support of a mixed equilibrium strategy is a best response as well. Mixed 
strategies, however, can also be interpreted as beliefs. Harsanyi (1973) showed that 
mixed equilibria arise naturally as beliefs associated with pure equilibria of a 
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Bayesian game in which the uncertainty that each player faces about the other 
players’ payoffs is explicitly taken into account. If one allows for the payoffs to be 
slightly uncertain, but each player being perfectly informed about his own payoff, 
then we have a larger Bayesian game  in which each player can play a pure 
strategy as for each payoff realization a specific pure action is optimal. However, 
as opponents do not know payoff realization, they will be uncertain about 
what action will actually play. Given an equilibrium  of a generic strategic game 
 one can find an equilibrium  of the Bayesian game  such that, in the 
limit, as the uncertainty vanishes, for each the beliefs of opponents 
associated with  converge to . 
 
As noted, Nash’s non-cooperative model is a generalization of Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s 2-person zero-sum game. Indeed, Nash’s equilibrium concept is a 
generalization of their minimax solution. The founders of game theory asked the 
question what is the highest payoff that a player can guarantee himself and they 
defined a minimax strategy as one that guarantees this value. For 2-person zero-sum 
games,  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for each player , is a minimax 
strategy. If games are not strictly competitive, however, the two concepts differ; 
best responding against a player that pursues his own interests is different from 
optimally defending yourself against somebody that plays against you.  
 
 C D   L R   S R 
C 3,3 0,4  U 5,1 0,0  S X,X X,0 
D 4,0 1,1  D X,X 1,5  R 0,X 4,4 
a) prisoners’ dilemma  b) Battle of the Sexes  c) Stag Hunt 
 
Table 2: Three strategic form games 
 
Table 2 lists three well-known games. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma (Table 2a),  
is the unique Nash equilibrium. This shows that an equilibrium may be (Pareto) 
inefficient; another outcome is preferred by both players. That constraints on 
cooperation can hurt players is unsurprising; they no doubt would agree on , 
if they could sign binding contracts. ‘Battle of the Sexes’ (Table 2b, with X=0) is a 
game with two pure equilibria, and a mixed strategy one yielding each player 
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hence, a game may have multiple equilibria. In Stag Hunt (Table 2c, with 
),  and  are Pareto ranked equilibria. Although  yields higher 
payoffs for both players,  is a safer strategy: it guarantees the payoff X, while, if 
only one player chooses , he ends up with  In this game, there is a conflict 
between risk dominance and payoff dominance: if , then  risk 
dominates  (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). The strategic game from Table 1 
(with shows that some Nash equilibria may be unstable.  is a Nash 
equilibrium, but, for ,  is always at least as good as  and sometimes it is strictly 
better; hence,  weakly dominates . We conclude that Nash equilibria always exist, 
that there may be multiple (non-equivalent) equilibria, and that some equilibria may 
be unstable. 
 
By means of a model similar to Harsanyi’s, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) have 
shown that common payoff uncertainty can eliminate equilibria, hence, can serve as 
an equilibrium selection device. Consider a game as in Table 2c. If  then  is 
a strictly dominated strategy;  is strictly dominated if , while for intermediate 
values, there are multiple equilibria. Carlsson and Van Damme consider the 
situation where  can take any real value, with players facing uncertainty, but each 
player receiving a reasonably accurate independent signal  about the true value of 
 before making his decision. They coined the term ‘global game’ for the resulting 
Bayesian game. If  receives a very large signal he can be reasonably 
sure that  is dominated, hence he will play . Similarly, each player will choose  
if his signal is very negative. It is natural to focus on simple (switching point) 
equilibria of the global game in which each plays  if and only if , for 
some  indeed the authors show that under certain assumptions only such 
equilibria exist. In such a Bayesian equilibrium, a player must be indifferent when 
receiving the signal  However, as each player believes that the events and 
are approximately equally likely, indifference can hold only if  In 
the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, players, hence, coordinate on the risk dominant 
equilibrium of the Stag Hunt. For further discussion on global games, on the 
conditions under which these have unique limit equilibria, the relation with common 





3.2 Rationalizability, iterated dominance and correlated equilibria 
 
Nash equilibrium assumes that players optimize and have correct beliefs about their 
opponents. The concept of rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984) keeps 
the first assumption, but relaxes the second. It can be obtained as outcome of an 
interactive process. In the first step, all beliefs are allowed and any player  can 
choose any best response to these. In the second step, for any the beliefs of  
opponents are only allowed to put positive weight on strategies that are best 
responses for  and any player  is only allowed to play strategies that are best 
responses to profiles of the resulting beliefs. The ‘rationalizable strategies’ are those 
that survive iterative application of this procedure. In games with a unique 
rationalizable outcome, weaker rationality assumptions suffice to obtain the 
outcome. 
 
The above procedure is related to (but not fully equivalent with) the iterative 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies, where a pure strategy  of player  is 
‘strictly dominated’ if there exists a mixed strategy  such that 
for all . The difference is related to the question of whether beliefs 
about different players can be correlated or not. This issue does not arise in 2-person 
games, for which the two procedures are equivalent. Note that any Nash equilibrium 
is rationalizable, however, Nash equilibria may vanish if weakly dominated 
strategies are eliminated. (A pure strategy  is ‘weakly dominated’ if there exists  
satisfying the above inequalities for some  and corresponding weak inequalities 
for all .) 
  
Aumann (1974) introduced the concept of correlated equilibrium that generalizes 
Nash’s concept to games in which communication between the players is possible. 
It assumes that players can conduct joint lotteries (play correlated strategies), but 
cannot make binding agreements or side payments. As an introduction, consider the 
game from Table 2b with X=0 (‘Battle of the Sexes’). If players can communicate, 
they can decide to throw a coin together and to play  when the outcome is  
and , when the outcome is  This correlated strategy yields each player the 
payoff 3, which is a good compromise. Furthermore, the agreement is self-
enforcing: whatever the outcome of the coin toss, one player has a strong incentive 
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to abide by the agreement and to follow up on it, so that it is in the best interest of 
the other to do so as well. We have a correlated equilibrium: a correlated strategy 
which no player has an incentive to deviate from. 
 
It will be clear that any convex combination of Nash equilibria is a correlated 
equilibrium. However, we can do more. Consider again the game from Table 2b, 
but now with  and consider the scenario in which the players instruct a 
trustworthy mediator to randomize equally among the three cells of the matrix that 
have positive payoffs. Furthermore, they instruct him that, for each outcome of the 
lottery   shall only be informed about which row resulted while shall only be 
informed about the column. Viewing this information as a recommendation of what 
to play, one notices that, if one player always follows the recommendation, it is in 
the interest of the other player to do so as well. For example, if   is recommended, 
 knows that has been recommended (and will play) , hence,  yields the 
highest payoff. Similarly, if  is recommended,  knows that will play , 
each with probability ½, hence, again following the recommendation is best. The 
entire scheme is self-enforcing, hence, a correlated equilibrium, but it is not a 
convex combination of Nash equilibria. Formally, a ‘correlated equilibrium’ is a 
correlated strategy  such that, for each player  if , then  is a best 
response against ; in words: any recommendation  that any  might 
receive is a best response given  beliefs after hearing . 
 
3.3 Equilibrium refinements and stable equilibria 
 
We now focus attention on games in extensive form. Zermelo (1913) already 
showed that, in theory, chess can be solved by a backward induction procedure: 
starting at the end of the game, one works backwards replacing each decision point 
with the outcome that is obtained if a local best reply is taken there. It is 
straightforward to extend this procedure to any game with perfect information. Note 
that this procedure assumes persistent rationality: whatever happened before, each 
player assumes that all players will act rationally from then on. This assumption 
seems appropriate, but it is noteworthy that Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 




In the game of Figure 1, backward induction produces the Nash equilibrium . 
There is, however, a second equilibrium,  that is not consistent with this 
procedure. In effect, in this second equilibrium, threatens to choose and, if 
believed, chooses , so that the threat does not have to be executed. The question 
is whether the threat to play really is credible. What is at issue here is that the 
strategic form of the game seems to assume that a player can commit himself to a 
strategy. However, in a non-cooperative game such commitments are impossible, 
hence, when faced with the fait accompli that  has chosen , the best  can do is 
to choose . Strategies should not just be optimal at the beginning of the game, but 
also from each decision point onwards; in a non-cooperative setting, only backward 
induction equilibria make sense. When a player is rational, the possibility to re-
optimize should not lead him to deviate from his original strategy. 
 
Following Selten (1965), a large literature on ‘equilibrium refinements’ has studied 
the question of how to generally eliminate Nash equilibria that rely on ‘incredible 
threats’. Three related but conceptually different strands of literature can be 
distinguished.  
 
The first line groups concepts that aim to extend the backward induction procedure 
beyond games with perfect information. Selten (1965) proposed ‘subgame perfect 
equilibria’: equilibria that induce Nash equilibria in all subgames; a subgame being 
a part of the game tree that constitutes a game of itself. Kreps and Wilson (1982) 
strengthened this idea and introduced ‘sequential equilibria’. Such an equilibrium 
consists of a strategy profile  together with a system of beliefs  that for each 
player specifies a probability distribution over the nodes in each information set. 
Two conditions are required:  
(i) Sequential rationality: at each information set, the player’s strategy is 
optimal against the strategies of the others given the beliefs, and 
(ii) Consistency: the system of beliefs should be compatible with the strategy 
profile.  
Various formalizations of consistency have been proposed. The main advantage of 
this framework is that it provides a natural language to discuss ‘reasonableness’ of 
beliefs and of the associated equilibria, hence, sequential equilibria can be further 
refined by imposing additional conditions on the beliefs.  For example, in signaling 
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games, one can insist that, upon observing action uninformed players assign 
beliefs  to those types  of the informed player for which is 
dominated or equilibrium dominated. (See the entry on information economics.) 
 
In the second strand of literature, it is assumed that players will, with a small 
probability, make mistakes and it is required that equilibria be robust against this 
possibility. Hence, perfect rationality is viewed as a limiting case of slightly 
imperfect rationality. The seminal paper in this strand is Selten (1975), which 
introduced the concept of ‘perfect equilibrium’, based on the idea that all players 
make independent mistakes at each of their information sets. When players tremble, 
all decision nodes are reached with positive probability, so that an optimizing player 
is forced to choose a best response everywhere. Consequently, in the perturbed game 
there cannot be incredible threats. An  equilibrium is said to be perfect if it can be 
obtained as limit of Nash equilibria of a sequence of perturbed games when the 
mistakes vanish. As Kreps and Wilson (1982) define their main consistency 
requirement in terms of mistakes, there is a clear link between the two strands: any 
perfect equilibrium is sequential. The perfectness concept can be refined by 
imposing further conditions on the mistakes. For example, Roger Myerson’s proper 
equilibrium insists that more costly mistakes occur with much lower frequency.  
 
Sequential equilibria and perfect equilibria rely essentially on the extensive game 
structure. As a result, two extensive games with the same strategic form may have 
different sequential or perfect equilibria. Kohlberg and Mertens (1985)  argued that 
such dependency is undesirable: fully rational players are not misled by presentation 
details that are strategically irrelevant. Hence, they argued in favor of a solution that 
satisfies invariance, i.e. which only depends on the strategic form. The game from 
Figure 1 illustrates that the backward induction property may be uncovered in the 
strategic form:  the only strategy pair to survive backward induction in the 
extensive game, is also the only one surviving interactive elimination of weakly 
dominated strategies in the strategic form. Hence, we have two different rationality 
principles that produce the same outcome. More generally, a proper equilibrium of 
a strategic game induces a sequential equilibrium in any extensive form game with 
that strategic form. Hence, it seems possible that ‘robust’ equilibrium outcomes can 




Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) initiated the axiomatic approach to equilibrium 
refinement: they postulate several properties that a rational solution should satisfy 
and investigate whether a solution satisfying these properties exists. Examples of 
such properties are: (a) invariance (already discussed above), (b) consistency with 
one-person decision theory (admissibility), (c ) independence of strategies that are 
dominated or that are suboptimal responses against the solution, and (d) a solution 
should remain whenever a game is embedded in a larger one (the small worlds 
property). Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) proposed to strengthen perfectness by 
insisting not just on stability against one particular sequence of trembles, but  
against all small trembles. As typically a single equilibrium will not have this 
property, they suggested looking at minimal closed and connected sets of equilibria 
that are stable in this sense. This initial attempt did not satisfy all properties that 
they considered desirable, but Mertens (1989) next proposed a concept that indeed 
satisfies all of them. The definition of Mertens-stability is highly technical, insisting 
on certain homology properties of the best reply correspondence. Govindan and 
Wilson (2008) defined the related concept of metastable equilibria that is somewhat 
weaker than Mertens-stability, but satisfies the same decision-theoretic properties.  
 
We thus conclude that the question ‘how to exclude Nash equilibria that rely on 
incredible threats?’ has led to highly technical questions about the best reply 
correspondence of the game. Exactly why such sophisticated techniques appear 
necessary to solve such an intuitive question is still imperfectly understood. 
Nevertheless, that stability suffices for that purpose can be shown with a simple 
example, which also illustrates the concept of forward induction. Consider the game 
in which  first chooses whether to take up an outside option yielding him payoff 
2 or to play Battle of the Sexes (the game from Table 2b with X=0). Taking up the 
outside option is part of the perfect equilibrium : if  thinks that  will 
be played in the subgame, he is better off taking his option. However, this outcome 
does not seem reasonable:  not choosing the outside option and then playing  is 
strictly dominated. Being requested to play, it seems that should, therefore, 
conclude that  will play  and should respond with . Hence, only the outcome 




This same outside option game may, however, illustrate that in case communication 
is possible (hence, when the basic solution concept is correlated equilibrium), we 
cannot insist on the solution to just depend on the strategic form. Exactly when the 
communication takes place may matter. If players can only communicate before the 
start of the game,  can never be induced to play hence, communication is 
immaterial and the outcome is ( ). On the other hand, if players can communicate 
after has thrown away his option, then players can randomize between ( ) and 
( ), hence, can be induced to give up his option. Extensive form correlated 
equilibria are different from strategic form correlated equilibria, and for good 
reasons; see Myerson (1991; chapter 6), where one can also find some remarks on 
how to refine correlated equilibria. 
 
 
4. BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY 
 
Conventional game theory, with its focus on the question ‘how will rational players 
play?’ frequently makes sharp predictions about the outcome or about how this 
outcome changes with a change in the data (comparative statics), hence, studying 
the theory’s empirical relevance appears quite natural. Testing with field data, 
however, has its limitations, and although there are exceptions, serious experimental 
investigation of the descriptive relevance of rationality-based theory only started in 
the 1980s (Kagel and Roth, 1995). The first wave of experimental studies 
established that standard theory sometimes (or frequently, depending on one’s 
viewpoint) provides poor predictions of how humans play, and that there are 
systematic patterns in the deviations, which has then led to revised theories (or at 
least models) of play incorporating these regularities. In the last 25 years, emphasis 
has thus shifted to the question ‘how do humans play non-cooperative games?’, 
leading to a strong interaction between theory and empirical work.  
 
This section provides a brief overview of the results that have been achieved in this 
rapidly developing field. We start by describing how human players deviate from 
conventional rationality. Three aspects can be distinguished: (i) motivation (what 
drives people; how do players evaluate outcomes?); (ii) cognition (how do people 
reason; what thinking processes do they use when they are confronted with a new 
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game?) and (iii) adaptation: (how do people learn when they play the same game 
repeatedly?). After having described empirical regularities, we briefly discuss novel 
theories relating to each of these aspects.  
 
4.1 Bounds on human rationality 
  
Humans have emotions, face cognitive limitations, and may be under (time) 
pressure; they process information differently, or may be motivated differently than 
standard theory assumes. Conventional theory is silent on the decision making 
processes that are used. It assumes that players only differ in preferences, not in 
cognitive abilities. Models of bounded rationality take into account limits on human 
knowledge, informational processing capacity and computational ability. 
Obviously, in some games, these limits are more important than in others.  
 
When observed behavior differs from the game theoretic prediction, one can point 
to one of two main causes:  
(i) the game, as perceived by the players, is different from the one analyzed by 
the theorist; or  
(ii) the solution concept is not applicable in this situation. 
 
Conventional game theory starts with the model and assumes that it is common 
knowledge among the players. Real life conflict situations are less structured  and 
have to be interpreted; a model has to be constructed, and different players may 
perceive the situation differently. At first, one does not necessarily see all aspects 
of the problem, leading to superficial decision making. Nevertheless, this may 
already produce a satisfactory solution, not inviting further reflection. Selten (1998) 
notes that such superficiality may explain the framing effect (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981): the way the situation is presented may have an important 
influence on the outcome. The reasoning process anchors at aspects that deeper 
inspection might reveal to be irrelevant. Alternatively, framing may provide clues 
to the solution that conventional theory mistakenly neglects; Schelling (1960).  
 
Traditional models assume that players are rational in the sense of Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (expected utility) and Savage (subjective expected utility). Mostly, 
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the assumption of players having a common prior is added. Following the path-
breaking Kahneman and Tversky (1979), behavioral economics has shown that 
humans deviate from these assumptions and the resulting behavior in systematic 
ways: (i) utility depends not just on the final state (outcome), but on changes in the 
state; (ii) the change is measured w.r.t. a reference point; (iii) losses loom larger 
than gains (loss aversion); (iv) individuals use decision weights that are different 
from probabilities, with small probabilities being overweighted and large ones 
underweighted; (v) information is processed differently than Bayes’ rule describes. 
(See the entry on Behavioral Economics for more details.) Furthermore, while the 
rational choice model allows general preferences, in empirical work it is frequently 
assumed that players are selfish and care only about own materialistic payoffs. 
Many humans are motivated differently: altruism and reciprocity play a role, with 
(social) norms influencing behavior as well.  
 
Equilibrium concepts assume that (i) players form beliefs about what others will do, 
(ii) these beliefs are correct, and (iii) players best respond to them. In equilibrium, 
players never are surprised. A game may be too complicated to find a best response, 
or players may be insufficiently motivated to find one. Equilibrium concepts are 
based on circular reasoning (fixed points; solutions to systems of equations), but, as 
stressed by Selten (1998), humans have a tendency to avoid circular concepts. The 
natural way of problem solving is by using step-by-step reasoning processes. The 
rationalistic interpretation of equilibrium assumes, but leaves unexplained how the 
beliefs of players that are confronted with a new game come to be correct , an 
assumption that is especially problematic in games with multiple equilibria. Finally, 
natural learning processes need not converge to (Nash) equilibrium, or the learning 
may be too slow to be practically relevant. 
 
Although for certain classes of games, non-equilibrium concepts, such as 
rationalizability or iterated dominance, are sufficient to predict the outcome, these 
rely on an unlimited number of iterations; humans seem to do only a very small 
number of rounds of iterated strategic thinking. Related, humans find processes like 





4.2 Empirical regularities 
 
Bounded rationality (the rationality displayed by humans in decision making 
situations), hence, differs significantly from perfect rationality. As a result, it is not 
surprising that experiments have revealed that outcomes observed when humans 
play games differ systematically from the standard game theory predictions; see 
Camerer (2003), Goeree and Holt (2001) and Selten (1998). The following are some 
observed empirical regularities: 
(i) Framing effects can be very important, even in simple zero-sum games;  
(ii) The outcome may depend on aspects of the game that conventional theory 
considers to be irrelevant; in contrast, aspects that the theory considers 
relevant need not matter; for example, two games with the same unique 
mixed strategy equilibrium may be played differently;  
(iii) Not only the ordering of the payoffs matters, but also payoff differences: 
strategies that are not best responses may be played and small payoff 
differences may be ignored altogether;  
(iv) Frequently, players care about other aspects than own (material) payoffs; 
(v) In games played once, the observed outcome may differ from the unique 
rationalizable one; in strategic games, people only do a small number of 
rounds of iterated elimination;  
(vi) In perfect information games, monitoring of the decision making process 
shows that players may not do backward induction; this procedure does not 
come naturally, but it can be taught;  
(vii) When players gain experience with a game, they adjust behavior; players 
learn in different ways and with different speeds, which may depend on the 
game; learning processes may be very slow.  
 
4.3 Players’ motivations 
 
The ultimatum game (Güth et al, 1982), along with its variants, the dictator game 
and the trust game, has spawned a large literature on social preferences. In the 
ultimatum game, proposes how to divide an amount of money between him and 
; if  accepts, the proposal is implemented; otherwise, each player gets 0. If both 
players are selfish (care only about own material payoffs),  offers (close to 0) to 
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, which the latter accepts. Experiments, however, show that most offers are close 
to 50/50 and that the responding player may reject considerable amounts. The 
dictator game (the variant in which  is forced to accept all proposals) allows to 
test whether the behavior of  is driven by altruism or by the fear that low offers 
will be rejected. In the trust game,  can first transfer all or part of the amount to 
, with that amount, , being multiplied by a known constant , and with  
subsequently deciding how much to transfer back. In this game, responding players 
display positive reciprocity: the larger the transfer received, the more is transferred 
back. In public goods games, we see negative reciprocity: players that do not 
contribute sufficiently to the public good are punished. All these games show 
considerable individual heterogeneity, while culture matters as well; Henrich et al 
(2004). 
 
While the experimental results do not refute game theoretic analysis as such, they 
suggest that great care is needed in modeling a situation as a game; the frequently 
made assumption of selfishness does not describe most situations very well. Player 
2 may be motivated to get a reasonable share and he may prefer conflict to an 
outcome in which he gets much less than the proposer. The game of Figure 1 is a 
kind of mini-ultimatum game:  may reject if Y is too small. On the other hand, if 
 and ,  might realize that is forced to divide asymmetrically; he may 
accept in this case, while he might possibly reject if  is large and  Hence, 
not only the outcomes matter, but also the context in which these arise; 
consequentialism is violated. In the literature, a large variety of models has been 
proposed and tested to incorporate these aspects, including models of pure 
distributional preferences, as well as models in which intent or procedural aspects 
matter. Given heterogeneity, incomplete information about preferences is natural, 
and there are also models in which players care about what others think of them. 
Sobel (2005) is a recent overview of the literature on interdependent preferences.  
 
In many models that fit under this heading, just the players’ payoff functions are 
changed by incorporating behavioral aspects, while the solution concept remains 
conventional. Geanakoplos et al (1989), however, argued that emotions cannot be 
captured by assuming that payoffs just depend on players’ actions. Players’ 
emotions, which influence how outcomes are valued (payoffs), will also depend on 
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their expectations and, hence, on what they learn in the game. For example, in 
Figure 1, if expects to choose , then he may be disappointed when asked to 
move and, therefore, choose  while a in that expected  may simply play   
Geanakoplos et al (1989) introduce ‘psychological games’ as games in which 
payoffs depend both on what players do and on what they think and they define a 
‘psychological equilibrium’ as a profile in which each player best responds and 
beliefs are correct. Rabin (1993) builds on this idea to construct a model that 
incorporates considerations of fairness. Starting from an ordinary game and players’ 
expectations, he first applies a kindness function to modify the payoffs to take into 
account the emotions and construct a psychological game, to which then the concept 
of psychological equilibrium is applied. The resulting outcome is called a fairness 
equilibrium. In the game from Figure 1, both the outcome (1, X) and the outcome 
(2,Y) can be supported by fairness equilibria.  
 
4.4 Modeling players’ thinking processes 
 
The p-beauty contest game (  illustrates the difference between individual 
human rationality and rationalizability. In this game,  players are asked to 
simultaneously pick an integer from {1, 2, ...,100}, with the person whose number 
is closest to  times the average being the winner (ties broken randomly). The 
unique Nash equilibrium is for all to choose 1; in fact, if only 1 is 
rationalizable. Experiments show that players that are new to the game exhibit 
distinct, bounded levels of reasoning. For example, for , games played with 
a large population of players, show spikes at numbers such as 50 (superficial 
thinking), 33 (the best response against 50), 22, 15, 10, etc.. Obviously, not all 
players are perfectly rational, and in such situations, a fully rational player should 
not necessarily pick 0.  
 
If one knows that other players are not that sophisticated and engage only in limited 
thinking, a natural idea is to try to figure out what naïve players might do and to 
estimate the distribution of ‘levels of thinking’ in the population , and to best respond 
against the resulting beliefs. For example, if one thinks that naïve, level-1 and level-
2 players are equally likely, one believes the average chosen by the others to be 35 
and choses 23. Theories of cognitive hierarchy (Camerer, 2003)) or level-k thinking 
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have been developed, and have been brought to the data with reasonable success; 
see Crawford et al (2013) for a recent overview. 
 
Some insight has also been gained on the question of how “naïve play” is obtained: 
players come to the laboratory with prior ideas and may seek for analogies with 
known situations, or may seek for clues such as labels and focal points; Schelling 
(1960). It has also been shown that backward induction reasoning does not come 
natural; for example, eye tracking studies show that many players only look for a 
limited time, or not at all, at the parts of the game tree that come later; hence, there 




When players get more experience with a game, they will typically adjust their 
behavior. As already suggested in Nash (1950), learning may produce outcomes that 
are more in line with equilibrium predictions. For example, in repetitions of p-
beauty contest games, smaller numbers are chosen over time. We already noted that 
there is a very large theoretical literature on learning. In broad terms, two types of 
learning models can be distinguished. In belief learning, players adjust their beliefs 
about what others will do and best respond to these. In reinforcement learning, a 
player’s own strategies have certain “attractions”, which determine the probability 
of playing them and which are adjusted through time. Camerer (2003) describes a 
hybrid model, experience-weighted attraction learning (EWA) that has successfully 
been fitted to the data of several games. The data and model show that learning is 
much quicker in some games than in others, hence, that players come to certain 
games with rather strong, but not necessarily correct, beliefs. Of course, not all 
people learn in the same way and some people may learn quicker than others. Selten 
(1998) stresses that learning may involve a combination of adaptive and analytical 
approaches. Players that view the situation as routine and use adaptive methods may 
fail to acquire an overview of the situation and, hence, may not be able to reach 









The allotted space only allows making just a few remarks on the applications of 
non-cooperative game theory; the interested reader is suggested to consult the 
Handbook of Game Theory or to follow any of the leads given below. 
 
One application is to cooperative game theory. The ‘Folk Theorem’ shows that when 
a game is repeated sufficiently often, players are sufficiently patient and obtain 
enough information about past play (and when some other technical conditions are 
satisfied), the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincides with those of 
the static cooperative game. Hence, in a context of repeated interaction, contracts 
may not be necessary to achieve efficient outcomes. Work of Nobel Prize winner 
Elinor Ostrom on the exploitation of common property resources combines this 
theory with rich institutional data. Avner Greif’s contribution to the Handbook 
surveys the related literature that employs game theory for economic history 
analysis.  
 
Following Nash’s (1950) suggestion, the literature has pursued the ‘Nash program’ 
and has shown that several cooperative solution concepts can be implemented non-
cooperatively, i.e. there exists a non-cooperative game of which the (refined) 
equilibrium outcomes correspond to those predicted by the cooperative solution 
concept. For example, the Nash-bargaining solution can not only be implemented 
by means of the simultaneous bargaining game proposed already in Nash (1953), 
but also by a very natural alternating offers procedure proposed in Rubinstein 
(1982). In a similar vein, solution concepts such as the Shapley value, the kernel, 
and the nucleolus can be obtained by non-cooperative procedures; we refer to 
Thomson’s entry in this Encyclopedia for details.  
 
Within economics, the field of industrial organization has proved a fertile ground 
for application. Probably the most successful applications thus far have been to 
auctions or more generally market design; see the entry on auctions. Following the 
seminal work of Vickrey, auction theory first focused on the questions of how to 
bid in a single-item auction and what is the revenue maximizing mechanism for 
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selling such item. In implementing spectrum policy, governments were, however, 
confronted with the question of how to sell multiple heterogeneous items, given 
certain objectives, such as market efficiency and raising sufficient government 
revenue. Research, in which game theorists interacted with experimental economists 
and Operations Researchers, has led to highly innovative auction designs, such as 
the simultaneous multi round auction and the combinatorial clock auction, which 
have subsequently been successfully implemented by various governments around 
the world.  
 
By using both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, and by combining 
theory with experimental and empirical studies, Nobel Prize winner Alvin Roth and 
co-workers showed that stability is important for understanding the success of 
particular market institutions. Building on this insight, they successfully re-
engineered several existing institutions, such as those for matching organ donors 
with patients. Importantly, this work shows that economics can take into account 
ethical restrictions, such as the prohibition of side-payments. 
 
As seen above, game theory has provided a strong stimulus for experimental 
economics. No doubt, the further development of behavioral game theory will give 
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